Volt Boot: Exploiting Power Domain Isolation to Bypass On-Chip SRAM Security
This paper introduces Volt Boot, a novel attack that leverages power domain isolation in modern Systems-on-a-Chip (SoCs) to compromise the security of sensitive information stored in on-chip SRAM. Traditional cold boot attacks are ineffective against on-chip SRAM, but Volt Boot achieves cross-power-cycle SRAM data retention by maintaining the voltage of the target memory domain during system reset. Experiments on three commercially available Cortex-A processors successfully extracted data from caches, CPU registers, and iRAM, demonstrating the attack's effectiveness. The research highlights new security challenges for systems relying on on-chip computation and proposes countermeasures such as eliminating power domain isolation, purging residual memory, resetting SRAM at startup, and enforcing TrustZone support.
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